Provincial–regional ANC politics in the Northern Cape: corruption or everyday informal practices? by Nzo, Thina
RESEARCH and EVALUATION 
 
 
© 2016 Thina Nzo. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
Unported (CC BY 4.0) License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the 
material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, 
provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. 
 
Citation: Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 2016, 19: 5490, - http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/cjlg.v0i19.5490          
                                                                                                                                               96 
Provincial–regional ANC politics in the Northern 
Cape: corruption or everyday informal practices?  
 
 
Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 
Issue 19: December 2016 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg 
 
Thina Nzo 
Centre of African Studies 
University of Edinburgh 
United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Research over the last decade on local government in South Africa has highlighted that some 
municipal councils under the political leadership of the Africa National Congress (ANC) have shown 
weak political leadership, coupled with strong patronage systems, rent-seeking and corruption which 
have had an impact on the institutional functionality of municipalities in South Africa. Although 
patronage politics have been predominantly used to analyse the dynamics of post-apartheid local 
government ANC politics and councillor representation, this prevents us from understanding the 
representational focus of ANC councillors in decision-making processes. This paper offers an 
ethnographic insight into experiences of ANC councillors and the political complexities involved in 
council decision-making. Using ethnographic research, this paper will analyse how a political 
decision by the ANC provincial party, which was supported by the ANC regional party at local level – 
to erect a statue of Nelson Mandela in one of the municipalities in the Northern Cape – generated 
tensions amongst ANC councillors who strongly viewed their primary role as promoters of better 
‘service delivery’ rather than approving the allocation of scarce municipal resources for erecting a 
statue. The paper reveals how the dominant presence of ANC sub-regional structures at local level 
contribute to the complex interaction of both ANC party political and municipal organisational rules 
and norms that influence and shape councillors’ choices in decision-making.   
 
South African post-apartheid local government and ANC party politics 
In August 2016, the African National Congress (ANC) experienced steep decline in local government 
elections, and the ANC lost control of three key city municipalities (Johannesburg, Pretoria and Port 
Elizabeth) and many more local municipalities to a coalition of opposition parties such as the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) due to voter apathy amongst ANC 
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loyal supporters (see Independent Electoral Elections 2016).1 This paper has given particular attention 
to the ANC and its councillors as the ruling party with the majority of seats in council2 which has 
powers to appoint its own majority ANC councillors as members of the executive committee and 
committee chairs. Therefore the ANC as a dominant party in the council has the responsibility of 
shaping and determining the agenda of the council and the political and development landscape of the 
municipality.  
However, the decline in ANC electoral support and control over municipal councils since 2006 
portrays how the ANC as a liberation party in power is beginning to lose its hegemonic grip over 
electoral support at local government level (Schulz-Herzenberg 2007; Schulz-Herzenberg and 
Southall 2014).3 More specifically, the recent 2016 election outcomes provided further evidence to 
support Schulz-Herzenberg’s conclusion that the ANC weakening voter support signifies a ‘silent 
revolution’ against the liberation party and decline in the quality of local democracy (2007, p. 114). 
Most analysts have heavily criticised the ANC party and its elected local representatives (in particular 
ward councillors and political office-bearers such as speakers, mayors and members of the municipal 
mayoral executive committee) for being embroiled in patronage and rent-seeking (see Staniland 2008; 
Ndletyana et al. 2014; Beresford 2014; Dawson 2014; Butler 2015; Butler and Southall 2015; 
Ndletyana 2015), neo-patrimonialism (Lodge 1998 and 2014) and corruption (Hyslop 2005; Mashele 
and Qobo 2014; Johnson 2015) that has led to decline in service delivery and failure of ANC 
councillors in carrying out their representational mandate.  
Some scholars have argued that service delivery protest action observed in most municipalities signify 
the pathological failures (Atkinson 2007) and ‘dysfunctionality’ of developmental local government 
state (Ballard et al. 2006; Southall 2007; Pithouse 2015; Alexander 2010; Butler 2010; von Holdt et 
al. 2011; Pieterse and Van Donk 2013; Booysen 2015; Pernegger 2015). Peter Alexander notes that 
such community protest action resembles conflict between the state and society, which is symbolic of 
a “rebellion of the poor”, arguing that while neo-capitalism has sustained massive inequalities in 
                                                 
1 See Independent Electoral Commission (2016), Municipal elections outcome, 
http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Municipal-elections-results/. [Accessed August 2016]; The 
Guardian (5 August 2016), South Africa’s local election shock down to anger and apathy, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/05/anger-and-apathy-behind-south-africas-shock-local-election 
[Accessed November 2016]; SABC (5 August 2016), Voter turnout drops in 2016 local government elections, 
http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/9fa2bc004dc1bd28be2bbf359257e443/Voter-turnout-drops-in-2016-local-
government-elections-20160508. [Accessed November 2016].  
2 Although the DA as the main opposition party has made inroads by increasing its voter support in the local 
government elections, it and the smaller parties – such as Congress of the People (COPE) and the EFF (break-
away groups of the ANC) – do not have a significant impact on the major practices and dynamics of local 
government council politics. 
3 Electoral support for the ANC has gradually declined from 64% in 2006, 62% in 2011 to 55% in 2016, with 
the ANC receiving less than 50% voter support in four out of eight metropolitan municipalities they previously 
controlled. The recent 2016 election outcomes provided further evidence to support Schulz-Herzenberg’s 
conclusion that weakening support and absence from the ballot box signifies a ‘silent revolution’ which leads 
to a decline in quality of local democracy (2007, p. 114).  
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South Africa, citizens have become weary of the “inadequacy of service delivery and self-seeking 
councillors who are not accountable to the electorate” (2010, pp. 25–40).  
In this case, the question of state capacity to deliver services4 and community protest action have 
become a focus of commentary for many academics and analysts engaged in local government studies 
and ANC politics. Public administration scholars such as De Visser (2010) and Cameron (2010) who 
paid particular attention to the functionality of municipalities, have directed attention towards the 
inefficiencies of municipal bureaucracies, arguing that political appointments and ANC interference 
in the running of municipalities have promoted widespread bureaucratic incompetence and 
inefficiency. Here analysts and academics begin to question not only the capability of the state to 
deliver on its constitutional ‘developmental’ mandate (Butler 2010; Von Holdt 2010; Fine 2010) but 
also the way in which the ANC has managed to conflate the party with the state (Booysen 2015).5  
While scholars are beginning to take more interest in local government research, which adds valuable 
insight to the understanding of the dynamics and challenges of local democracy, they have provided 
little insight about the complexities of representative local democracy to explain the everyday 
experiences of councillors in the process of council decision-making from the perspective of elected 
representatives using ethnography. In other words we know little about what happens behind the 
council chamber and the executive committee in order to understand how ANC councillors take 
decisions. This paper argues that although the concept of patronage politics has been predominantly 
employed by academics and scholars to analyse the ANC and state–society relationship at local 
government level in South Africa, it prevents us from understanding the complexities and nuances of 
how ANC councillors in particular, exercise their representational focus in council decision-making 
structures.  
This paper is based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out in a local municipality6 in the Northern 
Cape Province between September 2014 and August 2015. The political executive sphere of the 
municipal organisation was the primary context for examining the dynamics of council decision-
making processes by exploring the relationship between ANC mayoral executive member councillors 
and their ANC regional party officials, as well as other institutional actors such as senior managers. 
The organisational ethnographic study involved ‘being there’ (Rhodes et al. 2007; Rhodes 2007) by 
                                                 
4 Even though councillors are not responsible for administering services to communities, representing the 
service delivery needs and interests of communities remains the core of their representational role and focus. 
5 The State of Local Governance in South Africa Report (COGTA 2009) resonates with some of the arguments 
made by Smoke (2003) affirming that ineffective decision-making and weak accountability (and where elected 
members do not understand their roles and powers) as a result of weak political opposition and civil society, 
have prevented the deepening of local democracy through decentralisation in Africa. 
6 Due to politically sensitive issues and practices encountered during my study which might be considered as 
politically out of the norm, I have opted not reveal the name of the municipality and gave the participants 
pseudonyms in order to protect their identity.  
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shadowing the mayor7 (the political head of the municipal organisation) and observing councillors 
during committee and council meetings. This was supported by informal conversations with ANC 
councillors and conducting semi-structured one-to-one interviews and focus group interviews and 
analysis of documentation of council and committee meetings and decisions (Yin 1989; Babbie and 
Mouton 2001; Ritchies and Lewis 2003; Van Hulst 2008; Brewer 2004; Burawoy 2003; Ybema and 
Kamsteeg 2009; Thedvall 2006, 2013).  
The paper stresses that the councillors do not operate in a vacuum; they operate in a political 
environment that is regulated by party political processes as well as institutional rules and procedures 
relating to their prescribed roles and responsibilities. Councillors’ representation is also influenced by 
competing interests (Copus 2004) of the electorate as well as other state actors such as the 
administration and ANC party political structures, the latter either constraining or enabling councillors 
to carry out their representational mandate. Accordingly decision-making structures are potential sites 
of contestations and therefore permeated by tensions and conflicts between the prescribed roles and 
responsibilities and the real conduct of councillors and administrators. For Oliver (2011, pp. 202–203) 
using “sense-making” enables us to “understand how external factors and internal preferences, logics 
and ideals interplay within a particular context to define the enactment of representation”.  
Representative local democracy and council decision-making 
This paper locates itself within debates on local representative democracy (Mill 1865; Pitkin 1967; 
Eulau 1978). Councillors are elected local representatives and therefore viewed as key mediators 
between the state and society. Although there is an expectation that councillors ought to have a 
parochial community/ward orientation towards representation (Copus 2004), however, their 
representational focus is fluid and interfaces between political management committee work, 
community constituency/ward work and party related activities (Heclo 1969). Decision-making is one 
of the key political management roles of councillors serving in the executive and other committees. 
This relates to deciding on what public goods to deliver, how to allocation and distribute resources, 
which methods to choose from to deliver public goods, and how to achieve social change (see Parsons 
1995) as well as a financial oversight role to play in ensuring that municipal finances are distributed to 
society in a transparent and accountable manner (SALGA 2006). While the study of decision-making 
is underpinned by long-standing theories on decision-making such as rationale and incremental 
decision-making (see Lasswell 1956; Lindblom 1959), in the context of this paper, council decision-
making in a councillor’s world of party politics does not fit easily within such prescriptive decision-
making theories and models.  
                                                 
7 The mayor of the municipality granted access into the field. My constant engagement with the mayor prior to 
the fieldwork and professional networks I had with the ANC provincial party officials made it less difficult in 
terms of knowing whom to talk to in order to gain access. Personal and professional networks can be 
advantageous in establishing direct communication and gaining access to political elites and bureaucratic 
organisations.  
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This paper thus draws on the literature that appreciates that council decision-making can be a messy 
process that involves consensus and political negotiation (Lindblom 1959) amongst various interested 
groups, giving rise to conflict and tensions. Different interests and popular power is realised through 
group activity (Dearlove 1973; Fung and Wright 2001) the working of the political parties each 
represents one of the many interests. This is grounded in Dahl’s seminal 1956 study of power in 
relation to pluralism, where he argues that power in societies is widely distributed amongst different 
groups but not equally distributed, but rather sources of power unequally though widely distributed 
amongst individuals and groups in society. In this case, power is distributed amongst political actors, 
councillors and senior managers who influence decision-making. 
ANC party and state conflation  
The partisan system of local government in South Africa has given the ANC as a dominant party more 
political authority and presence in the activities of council and councillor representation. ANC party 
political mandates are also informed by the nature of councillors’ relationship and connection with 
the ANC regional party structure at local level (Corina 1974), which suggests that councillors have 
the dual mandate of representing the interests of the party and community. There has been some 
considerable scholarly focus on how the ANC has created a compliant party–state, where lines 
between the party and state are often blurred. This is underpinned by the argument of how the ANC 
has managed to use the liberation discourse to exert its hegemony and power over the levers of power 
in the state apparatus as a dominant party (Giliomee and Simkins 1999; Bompani 2006; Dorman 
2006; Booysen 2015; Butler 2009, 2015; Suttner 2009). These scholars and commentators have raised 
criticism and concerns on how the ANC has managed to entrench its political dominance through the 
use of state power and distribution of state resources in exchange for party support to generate control 
and political power (Butler 2010). While this paper contributes to this argument, on the other hand it 
provides a different perspective on how the ANC has a dominant grip over its elected incumbents 
(ANC councillors), which has an impact on their executive autonomy in municipal decision-making.  
This paper moves beyond the dominant national discourse on ANC national politics and current 
President Jacob Zuma’s hold onto power as a premise for examining ANC party–state conflation 
(Southall and Daniel 2009; Southall 2007, 2013; Butler 2009; Booysen 2015). The politics of the 
ANC and local government state are more complex and vary significantly because of the close 
proximal location, legitimate political authority and power that the ANC sub-national structures such 
as the regional executive committee of the ANC have over municipal executives and councillors.  
In order to understand the dynamics of municipal decision-making, the paper draws our attention to 
both the ANC’s historical and present context in its party political management practices, which have 
an impact on the everyday politics of councillor representation in decision-making. Drawing on the 
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ANC’s principal of democratic centralism, borrowed from the Soviet Union,8 it helps to understand 
why the ANC, post the liberation, continues to operate in a hierarchical and centralised manner when 
it comes to political decision-making. Although this does not suggest that the ANC operates as a 
socialist party, it stresses the point that political management ideology borrowed from the Soviet 
Union continues to find presence in the everyday political management practices and language of the 
party post the liberation. Within the system of democratic centralism, there is an expectation that 
political decisions concerning local government made in provincial and regional political structures 
are binding to ANC councillors and ought to be supported and defended by them without question 
(Suttner 2009; Southall 2007). In this case, the ANC sees itself as having legitimate political authority 
over ANC incumbents in state structures.  
Within the blurred lines between the ANC party and the state, this paper provides evidence which 
supports the assertions made by scholars that the ANC regional executive committee attempts to 
control the agenda of policy decision-making through micro-management of councillors (Lotshwao 
2009; Piper and Anciano 2015; Piper and Deacon 2015) and politically appointed municipal 
bureaucrats (De Visser 2010; Cameron 2010). While ANC regional structures have subordinated 
municipal structures, such as the municipal mayoral executive committee, into taking collective 
decisions that show loyalty for the party, this paper argues that loyalty and cooperation comes with a 
significant degree of resistance and unwillingness, which generate tensions between the “two centres 
of power” (Reddy 2014) i.e. the ANC regional party structure and the mayoral executive committee. 
Thus, the influence of the ANC regional party structures does not always guarantee consensus and 
cooperation from the mayoral executive over council decisions. The case of the Nelson Mandela 
statue provides us with insight into the tensions and conflicts that arise from this subordination.  
Service delivery or Nelson Mandela statue: a case of council decision-making  
Background of the Nelson Mandela commemoration project 
Upon the passing of Nelson Mandela, the first president of post-apartheid South Africa on 5th 
December 2013, the provincial executive committee of the ANC in the Northern Cape, which is an 
elected provincial party in charge of the political management of the ANC in the province, took a 
decision to erect a statue of Nelson Mandela in one municipality in the province as a part of the ANC 
national party political mandate of commemorating the ANC anti-apartheid struggle icon. The ANC 
as a liberation movement has followed an African post-colonial agenda of erecting monuments to 
celebrate the liberation from colonialism and pay tribute to those who sacrificed their lives in the 
                                                 
8 Stephen Ellis (2012) in his work on The ANC in Exile 1960-1990 during the years of the liberation struggle 
provides a detailed account of the longstanding relationship between the ANC and the Soviet Union. In his book, 
we able to trace the historical Marxist-Leninist ideologies such as Democratic Centralism and the National 
Democratic Revolution, which were adopted by the ANC in its party political language and management 
practices that were borrowed from the Soviet Union. 
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struggle (Marschall 2010).9 In South Africa, the monument and memorial heritage landscape inherited 
from apartheid represented an oppressive past that focused on the heritage values of the minority 
White South Africans under the colonial and apartheid government state... 
The erection of post-apartheid monuments10 was part of a broader political and social transformation 
agenda driven by the general understanding that they could be used as “gestures of compensation” 
(Marschall 2004), which could facilitate a dialogue with the old regime while enabling a process of 
mourning, confronting the past and nation building. After 1994, there was a general acceptance for the 
ANC national government to embark on a series of heritage commemoration projects in various 
municipalities, some funded directly from the government national treasury, and others from 
provincial and municipal budgets with donations from the private sector. According to Marschall 
(2010), the ANC saw erecting new monuments as a political opportunity for inscribing new political 
ideological values and national identity by fostering meaning for the post-apartheid state. Nelson 
Mandela as an icon of the anti-apartheid struggle became an ideal political symbol for inscribing these 
socio-political values. 
With Nelson Mandela’s passing there was national call from the ANC national party for provinces 
and municipalities to commemorate the legacy of the struggle icon. By the time I embarked on 
fieldwork in September 2014, the issue of erecting a Nelson Mandela statue was part of the 
municipality council agenda. In an interview with the mayor, he indicated that the ANC provincial 
party took a political resolution to initiate such a project in the municipality (interview, 24 October 
2014). He also indicated that this project was not part of the developmental projects in the five-year 
Municipal Integrated Development Plan (IDP) (2011–2016).11 Therefore as a project which did not 
feature in the initial five-year IDP planning and budgeting cycle, the council had to carefully evaluate 
the costs of the project. An ad-hoc committee12 was proposed that would specifically run with the 
project in order to oversee the project activities (interview, 24 October 2014).  
                                                 
9 For example, the gigantic Ghanaian Independence monument and the Zimbabwe Liberation War Heritage 
Programme (LZWHP), which established memorial sites like the Heros acre and museums as a way of mourning 
and paying tribute to those who lost their lives in the liberation struggle.  
10 Unlike most post-liberation commemoration projects, South African monuments and memorials were less 
confrontational, less racially exclusive and less aggressive in terms of visually denouncing colonialism (see 
Marschall 2010). 
11 Section 23 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 stipulates that municipalities should 
develop an Integrated Development Plan which is a policy document that outlines service delivery plans and 
budget priorities for a five-year cycle. This means that all projects are included at the beginning of this cycle and 
adjustments are made during an annual review in consultation with communities and ward councillors to 
determine whether resource allow for new projects to be included. 
12 These committees are given a time frame to oversee certain issues or even projects and should report the 
progress made to the executive committee and council and later disbanded once the issue is resolved or the 
project is completed.  
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The ‘Nelson Mandela ad-hoc committee’ was already established by the time the fieldwork for this 
paper was undertaken. Ad-hoc committees are usually established by councils when there is a critical 
issue which does not fall under a specific portfolio committee. According to the previous mayoral 
executive committee reports I had read, the Nelson Mandela ad-hoc committee was allocated 
approximately R500,000 ($37,000) to conduct a feasibility study on how best to preserve and 
commemorate the legacy of Nelson Mandela. It was noted in the report that since the municipality did 
not have the capacity or expertise on heritage issues, the Nelson Mandela ad-committee appointed a 
consultant to assist the committee with conducting the feasibility study (field notes, municipal 
council, October 2014).  
Out of the R1.7 billion ($121 million) budget of the municipality, an estimated budget of R10 million 
($740,000) for the project was presented by the Chief Financial Officer at the IDP Budget Steering 
Committee. It was proposed that the Nelson Mandela statue should be erected in the local township on 
an empty space near a motorway intersection, which was demarcated as the Mandela Park. The mayor 
was not very pleased with this proposal taking into account that it was costly and not budgeted for in 
the initial five-year IDP cycle, and was concerned that the municipality was struggling to provide 
essential services on infrastructure projects due to budget constraints. The question the mayor raised 
during the meeting was: 
Why are we allocating so much money [R10 million] ($740,000) for the Nelson Mandela 
Monument and yet only R3 million ($220,000) is allocated for surveying of sites? I can 
also see that there is an amount of R2 million allocated to the mayor’s car. Is this car a 
Maserati? Why do I need to drive such an expensive car? I’m not here for luxuries. We 
need to prioritise two things: service delivery and selling of land in order to get more 
revenue for the municipality. Reallocate R1.2 million ($88,800) for my car to land 
surveying, and get me a decent and affordable car. We need to carefully weigh our 
priorities and we must prioritise cost saving.… By the look of things we will have to get 
other stakeholders like the Office of the Premier on board to share the costs of this 
project (mayor, observation of the IDP Budget Steering Committee, October 2014). 
At first some of the senior managers chuckled at the mayor’s reaction with respect to the amount 
allocated for his car. Another senior manager mumbled that the mayor ‘deserved’ a car worth that 
value because of his long service in the public sector (observation notes, municipality, 29 October 
2014). The failure to recognise his sarcastic disapproval of the finance department’s rationale in 
allocating funds he thought were excessive annoyed the mayor, who emphasised that “we cannot be 
wasting municipal resources on activities that were not adding value to the primary objectives of 
local government” (observation notes, mayor, 29 October 2014). The mayor's concerns illustrate that 
mayors appointed as political leaders constantly have to critically question administrative advice on 
resource distribution and expenditure. His emphasis on service delivery and prioritisation highlights 
how municipal executive decision-makers are constantly faced with trade-offs when making 
decisions. Moreover, it shows how the mayor was being cautious about excessive spending of 
municipal resources on what he views as less important ‘luxuries’, which could be symbolically 
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interpreted as using state resources for self-indulgence and private gain which could be potentially 
problematic in the eyes of the electorate.  
The issue of excessive spending by elected and appointed government officials of government 
resources for private gain was under serious public scrutiny during 2013 to 2015 as a result of the 
perceived excessive spending on security for President Jacob Zuma’s private home in Nkandla, 
revealed by the Public Protector (2014).13 This issue coincided with the fieldwork, and was a hot 
topical issue amongst ANC councillors during the informal discussions for this project. ANC 
councillors often used the ‘Nkandla’ issue to illustrate how ANC politicians and state authorities were 
recklessly using state resources without prioritising the needs of citizens (field notes, municipal 
council, October 2014 – November 2014).  
The public discourse around the conduct of ANC officials ignited by the Nkandla report seems to 
have created an awareness amongst ANC politicians of the need to be more careful about public 
spending and to question the work of bureaucrats who misguide politicians. The mayor was thus 
making it an explicit responsibility to be more cautious about public spending and channelling 
resources towards improving the delivery of services to communities.  
Internal opposition and divided views amongst ANC councillors  
In November 2014, the mayor delivered his first quarter budget report, which included the budget 
allocation for the project. The ad-hoc committee also presented a verbal update report to council. The 
committee was advised that a full written report should be taken to council, to include discussion of 
the current conditions of existing monuments and heritage sites, so that the project would be linked 
with the municipality’s heritage landscape. ANC councillors, particularly the chairperson of the 
Municipal Public Accounts Committee (MPAC) – a committee that scrutinises the finances of the 
municipality – cautioned the committee that it should carefully monitor the financial spending on the 
proposal which should be within the budget. This view was also echoed by a DA councillor 
(observation notes, municipal council, 2 November 2014).  
After the council meeting, a short focus group discussion was held with six ANC ward councillors 
who were not on the Nelson Mandela ad-hoc committee to get their views on the proposed project, 
seeing that municipal finances seemed to have taken centre stage in the deliberations. They indicated 
that this project was hotly debated in the ANC party caucus14 before the council meeting. Although 
                                                 
13 See Public Prosecutor Report on ‘Secure in Comfort’. Available at: 
www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/2013-14/Final%20Report%2019%20March%202014%20.pdf   
14 The ANC Party Caucus is a group of councillors headed by the ANC chief whip to debate council agenda 
and agree on the ANC party position on issues that ought to be represented by ANC councillors in council. 
Therefore the ANC caucus and whip system facilitates a system of internal party democracy on council 
matters, ensuring the passage through which ANC regional and branch party decisions are cascaded down to 
the mayoral executive committee by means of debate and consensus through majority and popular vote.  
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ANC councillors understood and appreciated the political significance of the project, they raised 
concerns about the municipality spending money on activities they considered less to do with service 
delivery (focus group discussion, ANC ward councillors, 2 November 2014). One of the councillors 
who is a member of the Municipal Public Accounts Committee, expressed this view: 
We are not saying that we should not honour Mandela. But as a man who stood for 
moral values and principles, Mandela would not want government resources to be 
wasted on activities which do not benefit the community. Councillors are flying business 
class to Eastern Cape and Cape Town, staying in expensive hotels and getting big 
allowances, but meanwhile the municipality is in a financial crisis and our wards are 
suffering. Councillors are supposed to play an oversight role, but they are not doing that 
– they just accept things without questioning them. Other councillors will not ask 
questions because they are benefiting and enjoying the privileges that come with the 
project (focus group discussion, councillor, 2 November 2014). 
Another councillor added that:  
You should visit our wards. You will see…there are potholes everywhere. Municipal 
water pipes are constantly bursting because they old. But we are told there isn’t enough 
money to replace these pipes and upgrade our infrastructure. But the ANC leadership 
wants us to approve this project instead putting this money on service delivery priorities. 
How do we justify this to our communities? (focus group discussion, 2 November 2014). 
Thus, though the small focus group of ANC councillors did not overtly object to the project in 
council, they did not fully support the ANC caucus collective decision to proceed with the project. 
When asked why the councillors did not raise concerns in council, they said that as an ANC party 
group, they have to ‘collectively’ support decisions of the ANC party. Thus although the ANC party 
aimed to present a unanimous voice by endorsing the project in council, the reality behind the scenes 
was different (Copus 2004). There was a general consensus in the small focus group of ANC ward 
councillors that they held strong opposing views and questioned the political rationale behind the 
project under the prevailing financial constraints. They also indicated that their argument for 
prioritising service delivery was not strongly supported by members of the Nelson Mandela ad-hoc 
committee.  
Ironically, commentators such as Mashele and Qobo (2014) and Ndletyana (2015) suggest that ANC 
officials have lost their moral compass. However, in this case some ANC ward councillors placed 
emphasis on political accountability, and a moral economic argument based on the principles that 
Nelson Mandela stood for as leader. Spending money on commemorating a leader of high moral 
standing contextualised ANC councillors’ political judgement in this decision-making processes. 
Moreover, ward councillors were beginning to draw the link between the council decisions with 
expected service delivery outcomes for their constituencies (Pressman and Wildavsky 1978), which 
also has an implication on accountability of councillors to their communities for ward service 
delivery.  However, while councillors may have had the interests of their communities at heart, the 
process of collective group decision-making may have constrained councillors from fulfilling their 
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primary role as community representatives. This resonates with Copus’ (2004) argument on how 
representative democracy often yields tensions, especially where the dual representational roles of 
being a party agent and people’s agent (Newton 1974; Corina 1974) come into conflict as result of 
competing interests. 
Negotiating with ANC party structure behind the scenes 
The R10 million ($740,000) allocated to the project delivered by the mayor in his budget speech also 
gained negative local media attention.15 Councillors from the opposition party made media statements 
in the local newspaper, expressing their concerns with the project and questioning the council’s 
priorities on resource allocation. They complained about deteriorating infrastructure while the 
municipality was prepared to spend R10 million ($740,000) on a ‘monument’ (Daily Mail newspaper, 
2 March 2015).16 As a result, the mayor decided to develop a plan to contain the situation and prevent 
it from erupting into political leverage for the opposition party.  
The mayor indicated that he had raised his concerns with the ANC regional party officials around the 
‘negative publicity’ the statue project was generating in the media and amongst the opposition parties 
and his members of the ANC party in council (informal discussion, 15 March 2015). He 
communicated his suggestion to abandon the project. However, this suggestion did not receive much 
support from ANC regional party officials, including the ANC council chief whip, whom according to 
the mayor, insisted that the project should continue and be financed by the municipality. The mayor 
indicated that he decided to escalate the matter to the ANC provincial party officials and held private 
one-to-one talks to persuade them to put the project on hold until after the 2016 local government 
elections. The mayor insisted that:  
The matter is really spiralling out of control due to the negative media statements which 
are attracting unnecessary attention for the ANC. The opposition party is using this as a 
campaign strategy against the ANC before the 2016 local government elections. I’m 
worried because this municipality is struggling with its finances and this will make us 
look bad to our supporters (informal discussion, mayor, 15 March 2015).  
                                                 
15 As an ethnographer, my link to the mayor was known, and other organisational actors realised that he would 
be the key informant on politically sensitive matters relating to the municipality. Therefore protecting the 
identity of the mayor from other institutional actors naturally proved to be difficult. On the other hand I 
decided to let all participants (including the mayor) know that the findings of my research would not be shared 
with anyone in the municipality before the 2016 local government elections. I had to emphasise to my 
participants that the purpose of my research was not to expose corruption and bad conduct of ANC councillors 
and administrators, but rather to study how the institution works by reflecting on both its weaknesses and 
strengths, as well as practices, as these could assist in understanding how councillors respond and deal with 
challenges in municipal decision-making. I also adhered to ethical codes of conduct by keeping my informant 
anonymous, and treated information with confidentiality in order to maintain the trust I had earned from my 
informants. The mayor and key informants have seen a full draft of this work and approved it for publication. 
16 For the purpose of protecting the identity of the municipality and participants, I have used a pseudonym for 
the newspaper because the headlines of newspaper article on the statue contains the actual name of the town 
where the municipality is situated. 
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When asked why he decide to bypass the ANC regional party and directly talk to ANC provincial 
party officials, the mayor indicated that he had encountered resistance to renegotiating the project 
from the ANC regional party. There were also suspicions that ANC regional officials may have had 
personal interests in the project. The ANC provincial officials agreed to his proposal to put the project 
on hold.  
The mayor further persuaded the ANC provincial party officials to allow for long-term joint 
discussions between the municipality and provincial departments such as the Department of Arts and 
Culture and Office of the Premier, to assist in drawing up a business model for sharing the financial 
costs of the project after the 2016 local government elections. The aim was to structure the project as 
a development project that addressed the infrastructure developmental needs of the municipality, 
rather than just building a monument (informal discussion, 15 March 2015). This proposal was taken 
to the mayoral executive committee which then recommended to council to put the project on hold 
citing ‘resource constraints’ and explore other alternative models for project development.  
The political decision-making dynamics between the ANC region and provincial officials illustrate 
the hierarchal manner in which ANC decision-making processes are structured and the reciprocal and 
fluid approach to influencing party decisions. This reflects the ANC’s democratic centralist approach, 
which gives top-political structures the authority to make final decisions on matters concerning the 
party at local government level (Southall 2007). However, although the ANC provincial party 
structure sees itself as the highest decision-making body in the province above the regional structure, 
the mayor’s ability to sway the ANC provincial party’s ‘political mandate’ decision to reconsider the 
project in his municipality demonstrated that the influence between the party and mayor was a two-
way reciprocal process. This involved negotiations behind the scenes, outside the formal municipality 
executive decision-making spaces.  
The mayor’s direct access and connection to the ANC provincial party officials was a result of his 
close personal relations with ANC rank-and-file provincial government politicians. He also had a long 
political service as a former member of the ANC provincial executive committee, political head in the 
Provincial Ministry of Health and the ANC chief whip in the provincial legislature, before assuming 
political office in the municipality, which gave him the leverage to lobby key provincial government 
politicians. This leverage at provincial level was of little importance at ANC regional level, where his 
attempt to persuade the ANC regional party officials to cancel the project in the municipality failed. 
The mayor was not an elected member of the ANC regional party, which sees itself as a political 
authority over municipal decisions, which means that the mayor may have been seen as a subordinate 
rather than a senior party member, who should accept ANC regional party decisions irrespective of 
his former position in the provincial party and his current powers an executive mayor.  
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Reddy’s work on liberation parties draws on degenerative factionalism to explain how it has become 
characteristic for liberation movements in power to experience tensions and factionalism between 
“two centres of power” (2014, p. 221), referring to the ANC party structure and the ANC party 
members appointed to serve in government.17 Reddy explains how “party members serving in 
government” feel hampered by the constant interference of ANC party structures outside of 
government, while the ANC party structures outside government may also feel undermined by party 
members serving in government who are not responsive to decisions of ANC party structures (Reddy 
2014, p. 221).  
However, evidence presented in this paper on the intra-political dynamics between ANC regional 
party structures and the mayor suggests that it would be too simplistic to use ‘degenerative 
factionalism’ theory to explain the lack of political accountability of state actors. Rather, the political 
differences between party political interests at regional level vs municipal service delivery needs 
highlighted by the mayor illuminate the conflict between ‘two centres of power’ and struggles to gain 
control over municipal decision-making, influenced by the objective of some parties to distribute state 
resources for private gain as illustrated in the next section.  
Hidden financial misconduct 
The purpose of this study was not to expose a specific instance of local government financial 
misconduct or corruption. Rather the aim was to explore through observation the actions and practices 
of a set of local government politicians within their institutional setting. It cannot be ignored that as an 
ethnographer, one would encounter sensitive issues which may not easily be visible and accessible to 
outsiders due to the closeness of the researcher with the participants under study. Therefore consistent 
reflection became necessary at all times on my role as a researcher and the impact it would have on 
my participants upon the discovery of such grey areas. Nevertheless, it is important that any practices 
that could be considered questionable should be explored in order to analyse the reasons for such 
actions and understand how politicians deal with financial misconduct.  
After the mayoral executive committee's recommendation to put the project on hold, there was an 
unusual turn of events. One afternoon, on the 12th of April 2015, a month after the budget speech, the 
mayor called me to his office to talk about the discovery he had made concerning the project. 
Apparently, the mayor in his private engagements with one of the ANC provincial party members 
indicated that the real project value was R72 million ($5,300,000), of which the mayor and executive 
committee were not aware.  
                                                 
17 In Reddy’s (2014) work, he demonstrates how factionalism emerges from within the party due to competing 
“centres of power” generated by internal competition for access to state power and resources which mutate to 
degenerative factions. The degenerative factions analytical framework has been predominantly applied to ANC 
national political dynamics which emerged post the Polokwane Conference, where the ANC was divided into 
two dominant factions (Jacob Zuma vs Thabo Mbeki), ANC state political bureaucrats vs ANC party officials. 
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The mayor expressed the following comments: 
Apparently, a reliable comrade in the provincial leadership revealed to me that the 
project was allegedly going to cost us R72 million ($5,300,000) instead of the R10 
million ($740,000). It seems that the project is being pushed by certain individuals in our 
political ranks in the ANC regional party who want to benefit from it. I also discovered 
that huge amounts of monies had already been paid to the service provider. I am writing 
a letter to the municipal manager to conduct an internal investigation. I don’t want my 
name to be dragged in things which will put me behind bars. Like I said, we cannot 
afford to spend so much, meanwhile we cannot afford to upgrade our service delivery 
infrastructure. We need to focus on infrastructure development as we prepare for the 
elections (mayor, informal discussion, 13 April, 2015). 
This response first indicates that there was lack of transparency and some form of financial 
misconduct committed in relation to the project.18 However, this misconduct had been hidden from 
scrutiny by the administration from the mayor and his executive committee. Second, the response 
suggests that ANC regional party officials operating outside the municipal mayoral executive 
structure could use their political power and authority to influence the administration to irregularly 
distribute state resources. As noted by Olivier de Sardan (1999) such actions are difficult to pinpoint 
because of the discrete nature of interaction between state officials and ANC regional party officials. 
One can only confirm such actions through the media, with authorities, local talks and conversations 
with councillors (see Blundo 2007). As an ethnographic researcher, I have been able to develop a 
close relationship with my participants over the months. Ethnographers should build a good rapport 
with their informants (Agar 1996), who can eventually talk openly.19 In this case, the role of the 
researcher can mutate into providing reassurance, if not an opportunity for participants to vent their 
frustrations and negative experiences.  
Formal and informal processes of dealing with financial misconduct  
Against the backdrop of the mayor’s request to the municipal manager to conduct an investigation, the 
aim of the ANC provincial officials was to ensure that a political solution was found in order to 
prevent the situation from erupting into an unpleasant ‘political crisis’, which could dent the image of 
the ANC in the run up to the local government elections (informal discussion, 2 December 2015). The 
mayor who is in charge of the municipal budget and institutional governance, has a legal obligation to 
conduct investigations and report on the findings to the mayoral executive committee and to council 
in order for council to take disciplinary action against those implicated in financial misconduct (South 
African Local Government Municipal Finance Management Act 2003). Although the mayor did not 
disclose in full details of decisions taken by the ANC provincial party officials, the report was not 
                                                 
18 Section 171 (1a-d) of the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 53 of 2003 states that if 
officials should be found to have instructed an official to make an unauthorised transaction and provided 
misleading information to the mayor or council, this should be regarded as financial misconduct and disciplinary 
steps should be taken.   
19 Argar (1996, p. 138) provides several examples such as respect for other opinions, being a good listener, and 
adapting into group life by taking an interest in the experiences of informants, which encourages them to feel 
the need to talk to the researcher willingly. 
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brought to the mayoral executive committee or council meetings between October 2014 to August 
2015, the time at which the fieldwork was carried out.  
The year 2015 was a critical campaigning period for the 2016 local government elections; the mayor’s 
preoccupation with the elections and decision to involve the ANC provincial party officials indicates 
how decision-making can be influenced by both informal party political interests and formal 
administrative legal-rational. Although the mayor had expressed his disapproval of the financial 
misconduct, nonetheless this did not guarantee legal sanctions against the officials in the finance 
department bearing in mind that there were political implications considered important by the mayor. 
Towards the last month of fieldwork in July 2015, the mayor indicated that according to the municipal 
manager’s investigation outcome, it had been confirmed that there were indeed financial irregularities 
that were committed by the finance department and the report was handed over to the state legal 
authority (known as HAWKS) to officially open up an investigation into corruption (informal 
discussion, mayor, 21 July 2015).  
Due to the magnitude of the financial misconduct, the mayor indicated that he had no alternative but 
to hand over the case to the law enforcement agency for further investigation. He indicated that he 
also had written a statement giving his side of the story on what had initially happened concerning the 
financial affairs of the project in order to provide clarity on his role around the issue (informal 
discussion, mayor, 21 July 2015). There was no clear indication as what had happened to the HAWKS 
investigation. The ambiguous way in which the mayor dealt with this matter shows how political and 
bureaucratic norms and rules are applied simultaneously in the choices made by politicians in dealing 
with financial misconduct and deviations. For the mayor, it was both about protecting his personal 
integrity while also ensuring that his ANC party was protected from public exposure. As to whether 
the aim of the investigation was to initiate legal sanctions against the alleged officials involved 
remains doubtful as the matter was never formerly brought to the mayoral executive committee and 
council. Therefore it is difficult to disentangle the rationale and reasons for using both informal and 
formal channels of dealing with alleged municipal corruption. On the other hand, opting for the ANC 
party involved demonstrates the mayor’s dependency on the ANC’s political approval in dealing with 
state related matters, which constrains him from using his legislative executive powers and authority 
as the political head of the municipality.  
Patchwork of ethics, ANC party loyalty and bureaucratic rules 
Before completing fieldwork, I had another follow-up discussion with the Municipal Public Accounts 
Committee chairperson, with the intention of obtaining more information about how the MPAC and 
ANC as the ruling party in council, handled incidences of alleged corruption and administration 
deviations.  
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He provided this insightful example of the dilemma faced by ANC councillors when having to deal 
with administrative financial misconduct:  
Sometimes it is difficult to do these investigations because of political interference. At the 
end of the day this is our party [referring to the ANC]… We are caught in-between the 
rock and a hard place. Because of the interests of the party, you can’t dig too much 
because you will expose certain things that will dent the image of the party and fellow 
ANC comrades. The only thing you can do is to make the system work better now, putting 
in control systems in place in order to prevent [future] corruption (interview with MPAC 
chairperson, councillor, 17 August 2015).  
This gives an example of the ways in which party loyalty from ANC councillors is entrenched at the 
expense of applying legal sanctions and bureaucratic rules against the deviant behaviour of serving 
ANC party members. This shows how handling state official misconduct through a political process 
may allow impunity and may prohibit the elected officials from holding those implicated accountable, 
which does not accord with the Weberian bureaucratic legal-rational system. It has been common 
practice in the ANC where public service bureaucrats who transgress the public service code of 
conduct are rarely subjected to disciplinary measures.20 This can also be traced to the historic political 
culture of impunity and tendency to resolve internal problems through internal political processes (see 
Mashele and Qobo 2014; Johnson 2015).  
‘Corruption’ does not occur in a vacuum (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 77), but is embedded in amongst 
other mechanisms such as the political culture, patron–client relations, general exchange for political 
favours, a culture of impunity and the day-to-day routine of the administration that become very 
difficult to distinguish between corrupted practices and everyday informal practices (Olivier de 
Sardan 1999, 2014). This relates strongly to the issue that was raised by ANC ward councillors in a 
focus group discussion, where they indicated that one of the main problems which constrained 
councillors from taking legal action against municipal senior managers and administration was that 
they enjoyed ‘political protection’ from ANC politicians (focus group discussion, ANC ward 
councillors, March 2015). Thus local government managers and administrators associated with the 
ANC party appear to function within a system of impunity reinforced by the ANC partisan 
administration system of patron–client relations between ANC provincial and regional party officials 
and ANC bureaucrats.  
When asked about what ethical implications this had on councillors, particularly on the MPAC 
chairperson’s role as the chair of a portfolio committee responsible for promoting accountability, and 
ethical conduct of elected and appointed officials, the official provided another example of his own 
                                                 
20 The ANC recently established a party integrity commission in response to the escalation of concern over 
unethical conduct of some party members. However, the ANC Secretary General, Gwede Mantashe (2015) 
said that party structures needed to understand that the integrity commission was not a disciplinary committee, 
in which the principle of innocent until proven guilty applied ought to be adhered to 
(http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-28-the-anc-is-ignoring-its-own-moral-police). [Accessed June 2015].  
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personal experience, where he found it difficult to act alone if he did not have the support of other 
ANC councillors: 
For example, there was a tender awarded to a company that did not have tax clearance 
some time ago. The law says you cannot award a tender to a company that does not have 
a tax clearance. But these administrative officials awarded this tender but they are still 
working in our municipality. No action was taken by the municipality or the party 
[ANC]. I as the MPAC chairperson cannot take action alone. I need my ANC committee 
members to support whatever recommendation I make. If I don’t get the support, then 
nothing will happen. That’s why I stood up in a council meeting after delivering our 
MPAC report and emphasised that these officials must be named and shamed, so they 
can face consequences for their actions and be barred for participating in tender 
processes in the future. But that did not happen because the party [ANC] wouldn’t allow 
it to happen (MPAC chairperson, 17 August 2015).   
He further went to state that: 
When it comes to the debate about one’s ethical position, it’s a difficult one. I must 
confess, I for one am a little bit lenient when it comes to the party [ANC]. I remember we 
once conducted an investigation about monies which were paid out for disaster 
management relief. Our investigation led us to find out that these monies were paid out 
to ANC branch volunteers. When we told the party leadership [ANC regional party] 
about the findings, we were told not to pursue the matter because it would cause 
problems for the party [ANC]. So we closed down the report. But there is a limit…. if it’s 
an individual party [ANC] member attempting to enrich themselves, I have a serious 
problem and I won’t cooperate (interview with MPAC chairperson, 17 August 2015). 
This reflection provides a striking insight into another form of representational dilemma of ANC 
councillors serving as chairpersons of portfolio committees. The dilemma here is an ethical one as 
well as a political one – choosing between protecting the interests of the ANC party or the state when 
they have to take a position on how to deal with financial misconduct and allegations of corruption 
committed by fellow ANC party members who are ‘deployed’ as senior managers or elected as 
councillors. Firstly, this elucidates that ANC councillors do think about the personal ethical conflict 
which comes with the role of representing the state and ANC party political interests. However, there 
is fluidity and selectiveness in applying the law, where investigation reports are swept under the 
carpet because of the political implications it might have for the ANC party and partisan officials 
involved. Secondly, the personal ethical conflict also comes into play when ANC councillors 
willingly protect ANC party members and officials implicated in unethical and deviant behaviour. 
The willingness of concealing investigation reports is used as mechanism of showing loyalty.  
Thirdly, the interplay of personal ethical principles and general party interests in applying the law 
comes in when it also involves beneficiaries of state resources. In other words, the distribution of state 
resources to a critical mass of ANC members is viewed by the MPAC chairperson as more justifiable 
because according to him, it does not equate to self-enrichment of a few individual ANC members. 
However, private gain and mass accumulation of wealth by a few ANC party members using state 
resources may be strongly condemned by ANC councillors. This demonstrates inconsistencies in 
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dealing with corruption by ANC councillors, in what Anders (2014, pp. 135–9) termed as a 
“patchwork of morality” in his study on governance reform in Malawi. Thus dealing with corruption 
is carefully negotiated and interwoven with personal and political moral justification in decision-
making rather than a simple process applying legal processes (Therkildsen 2014, p. 124).  
It has been argued by Butler (2015) and Beresford (2014) that this blurred approach between the ANC 
party and the state processes in dealing with governance issues has a danger of undermining the 
autonomy of formal state processes when dealing with corruption. It also deters state actors from 
exercising their representational duty and role of holding those implicated in misconduct to account 
for their actions. Finding a balance between both in decision-making is highly valued by some 
political office-bearers and applied sporadically and selectively by others.  
Although there are formal institutional rules that govern institutional actors, designed to curb 
unwanted practices and promote public service ethics amongst politicians and bureaucrats, 
institutional rules depend on the actions of actors who give meaning to institutions. Lowndes and 
Leach (2004, pp. 561–563) state that, “local political institutions are embedded in a wider political 
environment and within a specific local context. This gives the notion that both formal and informal 
dimensions of state institutions create a complex interaction between both dimensions”. The formal 
procedures for dealing with allegations of financial misconduct in the local government legislation 
and informal ANC political process marks the tacit tensions between prescribed roles and 
responsibilities of councillors and the practical norms they apply in reality.  
Conclusion 
This paper has provided a detailed insight through account and observation of the everyday practices 
and complexities of council decision-making. Through the experience of the mayor and other ANC 
councillors and their relationship with ANC party structures, the paper also demonstrates the 
complexities of the dominance of ANC political management and the interface between the ANC 
provincial and regional party. Whilst ANC councillors and political office-bearers such as the mayor 
understand that their primary focus should be channelled towards representing the service delivery 
interests of their communities, the partisan role of ANC councillors often conflicts with popular 
citizen interests. The concern of the Nelson Mandela statue being viewed as a ‘wasteful expenditure’ 
by the mayor and other ANC ward councillors while the ANC regional party viewed it as a political 
priority demonstrates the tensions of councillor representation that may arise in local government 
decision-making. It also accentuates how councillors have to be cautious about allocating state 
resources for activities that would be viewed as non-beneficial in terms of providing basic public 
goods and services to the community.  
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Although statues and memorials have been seen as icons in the post-apartheid political agenda of the 
ANC, ANC councillors have become more sceptical about approving the allocation of resources 
which are seen as unjustifiable to communities. On the other hand this paper has been able to show 
the limitations of mayoral decision-making powers and functions, which are constrained by the 
dominant presence of ANC regional party structures, which wield authority and power over ANC 
councillors in municipal decision-making. Irrespective of the mayor’s executive powers, the mayor 
has to be a broker between the municipal organisation and the different levels of ANC party 
structures, using the media, opposition party and popular dissenting views of ANC councillors as 
tools in the negotiation. Therefore ANC political mandates and community interests are politically 
negotiated between decision-makers such as the mayor and his superiors in the ANC provincial 
structure. 
This paper has also demonstrated how large projects may also place decision-makers in a precarious 
position, because they can foster an opportunity for financial private gain for municipal officials and 
ANC regional officials. Despite a general perception that councillors are often entangled in municipal 
corruption, senior administrative and financial managers for the municipality are in fact more directly 
involved in the manipulation of municipal finances as facilitators for ANC regional officials as 
possible beneficiaries. The mayor’s choice of dealing with allegations of financial misconduct is 
influenced by the interplay of both informal and formal political and administrative norms and 
processes that are also shaped by his own personal norms and values.  
Political pressure to show loyalty to the ANC party experienced by the mayor and other ANC 
councillors forced political office holders to ignore legal recourse against those implicated in financial 
misconduct. In summary, the case of the Nelson Mandela statue has shown the need to understand 
that local municipalities are embedded within both internal organisational and external ANC party 
dynamics as sites of contestation. We have seen how prescribed legislative rules that define the lines 
of power and authority are contradicted by overlapping political party power structures seeking to 
capture power and authority in decision-making. It is within these complexities and contradictions 
that we need to understand the politics of council decision-making and councillor representation. 
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